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1487 
“BUT MY ATTORNEY DIDN’T TELL ME I’D BE 
DEPORTED!”—THE RETROACTIVITY OF PADILLA  
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Chaidez v. United States
1
 
(decided February 20, 2013) 
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A.  The Sixth Amendment 
A defendant’s right to assistance of counsel in a criminal 
prosecution is a right so fundamental that the Founding Fathers in-
cluded it in the Bill of Rights.2  This protection derives from the 
Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, providing in pertinent part 
that the accused shall “have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fence.”3  This guarantee exists as a mechanism to ensure that the 
criminally accused receive a fair trial.4  The right is so important that 
appointed counsel is available to every defendant who cannot afford 
retained counsel to defend the criminal charges brought against 
them.5  Notwithstanding the inherent guarantees afforded by the Sixth 
Amendment, there is no assurance that counsel will effectively pre-
serve the defendant’s rights.6  However, because the right exists to af-
ford a defendant a fair trial, the Sixth Amendment is interpreted as 
guaranteeing the right to effective assistance of counsel.7  In order to 
determine whether an attorney’s performance has failed to meet this 
“effective” threshold, the United States Supreme Court initially set 
the benchmark for ineffective assistance of counsel at arising where 
 
1 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3 Id. 
4 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963). 
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 686. 
1
Breslawski: The Retroactivity of Padilla
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
1488 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
“counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the ad-
versarial process that [consequently,] the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result.”8  However, through more recent case 
law, the Supreme Court has refined the test used to determine wheth-
er counsel’s representation has met the threshold, thereby upholding 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. 
B. Ineffective Assistance Claims as a Result of 
Deportation – Strickland v. Washington and Padilla 
v. Kentucky 
“[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is need-
ed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.”9  Although 
a defendant may spend time independently researching his charges 
and potential defenses after he is arrested for a crime, this is hardly 
equivalent to the knowledge and experience of an attorney.  Howev-
er, there is little difference between a defendant doing research for his 
own case and an attorney claiming to represent a defendant, but fail-
ing to provide any actual assistance.10  Thus, it is imperative in pre-
serving the quality of and pursuing justice in our judicial system, that 
the criminally accused not merely be afforded the right to counsel, 
but rather, “the right to . . . the effective assistance of counsel.”11 
In Strickland v. Washington,12 the Court established a two-
prong test that is still used in all ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims today.  The first prong requires that the defendant show coun-
sel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.13  A defendant may 
satisfy this prong by evidence that counsel made serious, fundamental 
errors such that the Sixth Amendment “counsel” guarantee was not 
fulfilled.14  Once a defendant has shown that the “counsel’s represen-
tation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under 
prevailing professional norms,”15 the claim is analyzed under to the 
second part of the test.  The second prong requires a showing that 
 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 684. 
10 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685. 
11 Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970)) (emphasis 
added). 
12 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
13 Id. at 687. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 688. 
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counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.16  A de-
fendant may satisfy this requirement by showing that, but for the 
counsel’s deficient performance, the trial would have had a different 
outcome.17  In contrast, a defendant may not satisfy the second prong 
by merely demonstrating that counsel made an error in the course of 
representation, if that error had no bearing on the outcome of the pro-
ceeding.18  Once the two Strickland prongs are satisfied, a court will 
likely find that the defendant’s counsel did not provide the defendant 
with the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. 
In a recent landmark case, Padilla v. Kentucky,19 the Court 
took Strickland one step further when faced with the question of 
whether counsel’s failure to discuss deportation consequences of a 
guilty plea with a defendant could give rise to a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel.20  Prior to Padilla, deportation had long been 
considered a collateral consequence, and thus, not a factor within the 
scope of the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.21  However, 
the Court in Padilla recognized that the Strickland two-prong test of 
effective assistance of counsel failed to distinguish between direct 
and collateral consequences.22  Although deportation is a severe pen-
alty that often accompanies criminal convictions, it is a civil conse-
quence in nature, and thus, was not considered a direct consequence 
protected by the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel.23  Ultimately, in Padilla, the Court concluded that because 
immigration consequences are so closely connected to a criminal 
conviction, it is likely they are direct and therefore defendants are en-
titled to constitutionally effective assistance of counsel in advising of 
those potential consequences.24 
At the heart of the Court’s ruling was its careful consideration 
of the severity of removal from the country, which makes advising a 
defendant of deportation as either a mandatory, or even possible, con-
sequence of pleading guilty, inextricably related to the accused’s 
 
16 Id. at 687. 
17 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
18 Id. at 691. 
19 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
20 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
21 Id. at 1481. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 1482. 
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right to assistance of counsel.25  The Court noted that while every at-
torney might not be familiar with the immigration consequences ac-
companying criminal charges, counsel is nonetheless expected to be-
come acquainted with the law, potential consequences of the charges, 
and if necessary, research the potential of deportation.26  The Court 
also addressed the potential floodgate issue and whether this decision 
would have an impact on convictions previously obtained by guilty 
pleas that resulted in deportation.  The majority proposed that be-
cause lower courts have applied the Strickland test for years, these 
courts should not have a problem altering it to include this new 
standard.27  Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that it has been the 
professional norm for attorneys to inform their clients when there is a 
potential for deportation, and thus, there should not be an influx of 
appeals claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on Padilla.28  
As the subsequent history of Padilla shows, the majority was quite 
wrong with their hypothesis. 
C. Writ of Coram Nobis 
The writ of coram nobis is encompassed within the All Writs 
Act and “provides a method for collaterally attacking a criminal con-
viction when a defendant is not in custody, and thus, cannot proceed 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.”29  A court will allow the use of this writ on-
ly when there is a continuing “civil disability resulting from a convic-
tion” that requires collateral relief.30  A circuit court has also de-
scribed the use of this writ as limited to “extraordinary” cases when 
the error is fundamental and there is no other available remedy.31  In 
order to seek this writ as a form of relief, the petitioner must show: 
“(1) a more usual remedy is not available; (2) valid reasons exist for 
not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse consequences exist 
from the conviction to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of 
Article III; and (4) the error is of the most fundamental character.”32 
Because of the uniqueness of deportation proceedings as a 
 
25 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 1485. 
28 Id. 
29 Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2011). 
30 Id. 
31 United States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 2012). 
32 Id. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 604 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
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consequence to guilty pleas, this writ is the most commonly sought 
remedy in the federal system for claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Immigration removal proceedings often do not begin until 
after a person is released from his or her custodial sentence, and 
therefore, the normal remedy of appeal is not available.33  In the cases 
where the defendant is given incorrect advice or is not advised on the 
matter of deportation at all, there is no reason for a defendant to at-
tack the conviction prior to the commencement of immigration pro-
ceedings, and thus, the writ should be available as a remedy.34  Re-
moval from the country would clearly be considered an adverse 
consequence such that it would satisfy the Article III requirement.35  
Finally, ineffective assistance of counsel claims may require a case-
by-case determination to analyze whether the attorney’s error was so 
serious that it prejudiced the defendant, and thus, whether the defend-
ant is entitled to relief under the writ.36  It appears in most cases that 
the first three factors would be satisfied for a defendant seeking relief 
from ineffective assistance under this writ and the ultimate decision 
will rest on the graveness of the attorney’s error. 
II. RETROACTIVITY OF “NEW” AND “OLD” RULES – TEAGUE V. 
LANE 
In Teague v. Lane,37 the Court explained that “[r]etroactivity 
is . . . a threshold question, for, once a new rule is applied to the de-
fendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires 
that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”38  
However, the determination of whether a rule is a “new rule” is not 
simple.  The Court held, generally speaking, a rule is “new” when it 
“breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the 
Federal Government.”39  In other words, when a rule is not “dictated 
by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became 
final” it will be considered “new.”40  If the Court does determine that 





36 Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 252-53. 
37 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
38 Id. at 300. 
39 Id. at 301. 
40 Id.  
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on direct review and will apply to cases on collateral review in two 
limited circumstances.41  The two exceptions to refusing to retroac-
tively apply the “new rule” to collateral appeals are when the rule is 
“substantive” or when it is a “ ‘watershed rul[e] of the criminal pro-
cedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the 
criminal proceeding.”42  In Teague, the Court stated the idea of finali-
ty in the justice system was the driving force behind denying retroac-
tivity to a “new rule” and “[w]ithout finality, the criminal law is de-
prived of much of its deterrent effect.”43 
To the contrary, a rule is considered an “old rule” if a “court 
considering the defendant’s claim at the time his conviction became 
final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude 
that the rule he seeks was required by the Constitution.”44  If the rule 
is classified as an “old rule,” it is applied retroactively to cases on 
both collateral and direct appeal.45 
Unfortunately there is a lack of clarity among the courts be-
cause the determination of whether a rule is “new” or “old” becomes 
exceedingly difficult when it appears that the rule simply extends the 
reasoning of a prior case.46  In Padilla, it is clear that the main ques-
tion before the Court was whether Padilla’s counsel was ineffective 
and fell below the objective standard of reasonableness as set forth by 
Strickland.47  Because Padilla has its foundations in Strickland, both 
district and circuit courts across the country are split on whether Pa-
dilla’s decision to include a failure to warn about immigration conse-
quences of a guilty plea as a violation of Sixth Amendment rights 
was just an extension of the Strickland decision or was an entirely 
new rule.48 
 
41 Id. at 303; Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 688. 
42 Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 688 (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (ci-
tations omitted)). 
43 Teague, 489 U.S. at 309; see also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“No one, not criminal defendants, not 
the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing that a man 
shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incar-
ceration shall be subject to fresh litigation.”). 
44 United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting O’Dell, 
III v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997) (internal quotation omitted)). 
45 Id. at 1153. 
46 Id. at 1154. 
47 Id. 
48 See Chaidez, 655 F.3d 684; see also cases cited infra section III. 
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III. RETROACTIVITY IN FEDERAL CIRCUITS 
A. Third Circuit 
In Mendoza v. United States,49 Mario Mendoza was an Ecua-
dorian immigrant and resided in New Jersey.50  While working as a 
licensed realtor, the government charged him with “conspiring to 
fraudulently induce the Federal Housing Authority to insure mort-
gage loans.”51  Mendoza’s counsel advised him that jail time could be 
avoided through a guilty plea, but failed to mention that pleading 
guilty to an aggravated felony would also carry a mandatory deporta-
tion consequence.52  Mendoza entered the guilty plea in March 2006, 
and subsequently learned prior to his sentencing that he may be sub-
ject to removal from the country.53  After he was sentenced, the gov-
ernment began the deportation process and he was forced to leave the 
country.54 
Mendoza filed a motion pursuant to Title 28, Section 2255 in 
an attempt to have his sentence vacated and guilty plea withdrawn.55  
In this motion, he claimed his counsel did not advise him of the po-
tential deportation consequences of his guilty plea and this could be 
evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel.56  Shortly after Mendo-
za submitted this motion, the decision in Padilla was rendered, and 
Mendoza accordingly withdrew his motion and filed a petition for a 
writ of error coram nobis, once again claiming ineffective assistance 
of counsel.57  In that petition, Mendoza stated that he would not have 
pled guilty if he had known of the immigration consequences of that 
plea.58 
The District Court found Mendoza to have unduly delayed in 
filing his petition for ineffective assistance of counsel, but Mendoza 
contended that this delay was due to the absence of Supreme Court 
 
49 690 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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precedent at the time of his plea.59  The Third Circuit found that re-
gardless of his delay in filing the petition, Padilla did not apply retro-
actively because it did not create a “new rule.”60  In that Circuit, at-
torneys had always been expected to advise defendants of the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.61  “More importantly, the 
government would certainly be unduly prejudiced by the re-
prosecution of a case involving facts nearly a decade dormant.”62 
B. Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit addressed an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim in United States v. Akinsade.63  Akinsade was a Nigeri-
an immigrant who became a legal permanent resident in the United 
States in 2000.64  Shortly before he became a legal resident, he was 
charged with embezzlement while working as a bank teller.65  During 
the plea proceedings, Akinsade raised the issue of immigration con-
sequences at least twice to his attorney.66  The attorney gave incorrect 
advice to both inquisitions and assured Akinsade that he could not be 
deported based on this one offense.67  Based on this assurance, 
Akinsade pled guilty and was ultimately subject to immigration pro-
ceedings nine years later, based on the embezzlement conviction.68  
Accordingly, Akinsade sought a writ of coram nobis, claiming he was 
prejudiced by his counsel’s misadvice.69 
In analyzing whether Akinsade was in fact prejudiced, the 
court distinguished his situation from the defendant’s situation in 
United States v. Foster.70  In Foster, the court found that Foster was 
not prejudiced by his counsel’s misadvice because the judge gave a 
detailed and explicit explanation of the severity of his sentence dur-
ing a hearing.71  Unlike Foster, the judge did not give Akinsade a de-
 
59 Mendoza, 690 F.3d at 159-60. 
60 Id. at 160. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 161. 
63 686 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2012). 




68 Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 250-51. 
69 Id. at 251. 
70 68 F.3d 86 (4th Cir. 1995). 
71 Id. at 88. 
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tailed explanation informing him that his plea mandated deporta-
tion;72 instead, the judge only advised that it may lead to deporta-
tion.73  Because the judge’s explanation in Akinsade was not as ex-
plicit as the one in Foster, the court found it was reasonable for 
Akinsade to continue to rely on his counsel’s advice.74  The court jus-
tified its decision explaining that “[i]f a district court’s admonishment 
so happens to correct the deficient performance then there is no prej-
udice; however, if there is no correction, then our scrutiny is not di-
rected toward the district court but appropriately to the constitutional 
offender.”75  Therefore, because the district court did not fix the at-
torney’s misadvice, and Akinsade clearly was concerned about the 
potential immigration consequences of his plea, as evidenced by his 
inquisitions, Akinsade was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of 
counsel.76  Affirmative misrepresentations regarding the deportability 
of a defendant results in ineffective assistance, a fundamental error 
that may be relieved through a writ of coram nobis.77  In a footnote, 
the court recognized that because neither party disagreed that the 
misadvice satisfied Strickland’s first prong of constitutionally defi-
cient assistance, it would not address whether Padilla was retroac-
tively applicable to Akinsade’s case.78 
C. Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit has decided two cases on this issue, United 
States v. Amer79 and Marroquin v. United States.80  The issue before 
the Court in Amer was one of first impression within the circuit, re-
garding the application of Padilla.  Amer pled guilty to a drug related 
charge and was subsequently eligible to be deported.81  After the de-
cision in Padilla, Amer submitted a motion to vacate claiming inef-
fective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failing to advise 
 
72 Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 254. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 255. 
76 Id. at 254. 
77 Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 256. 
78 Id. at 251 n.3. 
79 681 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2012). 
80 480 F. App’x 294 (5th Cir. 2012). 
81 Amer, 681 F.3d at 212. 
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him of the potential of deportation.82 
In order to determine whether Amer could prevail on his 
claim, the Fifth Circuit first considered the guidelines set forth in 
Teague in order to determine whether to retroactively apply the prec-
edent set by the Court in Padilla.83  As previously stated, a rule is 
“new,” and thus, not applied retroactively unless it was “dictated by 
precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became fi-
nal.”84  The court construed the decision in Padilla as a drastic depar-
ture from precedent, recognizing that prior to Padilla attorneys had 
no duty to advise defendants of the potential consequence of deporta-
tion accompanying a guilty plea.85  Rather, counsel’s duty was previ-
ously limited to advising the defendant on the direct consequences of 
the guilty plea, as opposed to collateral consequences, including im-
migration status.86  The court also noted that Padilla was not merely 
an expansion of the Strickland test, but instead created a new basis on 
which defendants may vacate their guilty pleas.87  Therefore, because 
the court found Padilla to have created a new rule, it did not apply 
the ruling retroactively to Amer’s claim.88 
Likewise, the court in Marroquin found that Padilla created a 
new rule, and thus, was not retroactive.89  Marroquin pled guilty to 
transporting an illegal immigrant within the United States, and thus, 
was subjected to immigration proceedings.90  She subsequently filed 
a writ of coram nobis, citing Padilla as the basis for her ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, and alleged that her attorney failed to ad-
vise her of the immigration consequences of her plea.91  Relying 
squarely on the circuit court’s decision in Amer, the court upheld the 
ruling that Padilla was a “new” rule within the meaning of Teague, 




84 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. 
85 Amer, 681 F.3d at 213-14. 
86 Id. at 214. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Marroquin, 480 F. App’x at 296. 
90 Id. at 295. 
91 Id. at 295-96. 
92 Id. at 296. 
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D. Tenth Circuit 
In United States v. Chang Hong,93 the Tenth Circuit addressed 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Hong emigrated from 
South Korea and became a permanent legal resident of the United 
States.94  In 2007, he pled guilty to a drug possession and was subse-
quently subjected to immigration removal proceedings.95  In 2010, 
Hong sought to vacate his conviction and withdraw his guilty plea, 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.96  In his motion to vacate, 
he claimed his attorney did not advise him of the potential deporta-
tion that accompanied his guilty plea.97  Hong’s motion was filed af-
ter the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Padilla, and thus, 
Hong used that decision as the basis for his claim.98 
In determining whether to apply Padilla to Hong’s claim, the 
court employed a three-step analysis to determine its retroactivity.99  
This three-step analysis included whether the conviction was final at 
the time Padilla was decided, whether Padilla created a “new rule,” 
and finally, if that rule was in fact “new,” whether it fell within the 
two exceptions to nonretroactivity.100  The court found the conviction 
was final and also that the rule in Padilla was “new,” but that it did 
not fall within the two prescribed exceptions. 
In finding that Padilla created a “new rule,” the court rea-
soned that “[b]efore Padilla, most state and federal courts had con-
sidered the failure to advise a client of potential collateral conse-
quences of a conviction to be outside the requirements of the Sixth 
Amendment.”101  The court also considered the lack of unanimity in 
the Supreme Court in rendering its landmark decision, citing both the 
concurrence and dissent from Padilla.102  Based on these two opin-
 
93 671 F.3d 1147 (2011). 
94 Chang Hong, 671 F.3d at 1148. 
95 Id. at 1148-49. 
96 Id. at 1149. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Chang Hong, 671 F.3d at 1150. 
100 Id. at 1151. 
101 Id. at 1154. 
102 Id. at 1154-55. 
In a concurrence, Justice Alito . . . stated ‘the Court’s decision marks a 
major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law’ and noted the majority failed 
to cite any precedent for the premise that a defense counsel’s failure to 
provide advise concerning the immigration consequences of a criminal 
11
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ions, the circuit court found it hard to believe that the Padilla rule 
was “compelled or dictated by the Court’s prior precedent.”103  The 
court in Hong further expressed its disapproval of the Third Circuit’s 
holding in United States v. Orocio,104 which stated Padilla was an 
“old rule,” and thus, could be retroactively applied on collateral re-
view.105  In contrast to relying on the long-standing professional 
norms argument as the Third Circuit did, the Tenth Circuit found Pa-
dilla created a new rule because “it applied Strickland to collateral 
civil consequences of conviction—a line courts had never crossed be-
fore.”106  The court’s final argument to support its position of Padilla 
creating a new rule was the distinction between “what it applies—
Strickland—[and] where it applies—collateral immigration conse-
quences of a plea bargain.”107 
Ultimately, the court did not find that Padilla applied to 
Hong’s claim because as a “new rule” it needed to fall within the two 
narrow exceptions in order to retroactively apply.108  The court stated 
Padilla did not fall within the first exception because it did not create 
a substantive rule, but instead a procedural one.109  The Tenth Circuit 
also found that Padilla did not fall within the second exception either 
because the Supreme Court had repeatedly refused to find a rule cre-
ated to be so fundamental to criminal procedure that it should be 
available retroactively.110  Thus, because the “new rule” of Padilla 
did not fall within the prescribed exceptions, it could not be retroac-
tively applied on collateral appeals and the Tenth Circuit denied 
Hong’s motion.111 
 
conviction violated a defendant’s right to counsel. . . . Similarly, Justice 
Scalia in a dissent . . . argued the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does 
not extend to ‘advice about the collateral consequences of conviction’ 
and that the Court, until Padilla, had limited the Sixth Amendment to 
advice directly related to defense against criminal prosecutions.  Id. 
103 Chang Hong, 671 F.3d.at 1155. 
104 645 F.3d 630 (2011). 
105 Chang Hong, 671 F.3d at 1155.  “[B]ecause Padilla followed directly form Strickland 
and long-established professional norms, it is an “old rule” for Teague purposes and is retro-
actively applicable on collateral review.”  Orocio, 645 F.3d at 641. 
106 Chang Hong, 671 F.3d at 1155. 
107 Id. at 1156. 
108 Id. at 1157. 
109 Id. (noting that because it was simply a change in the way an attorney advises a de-
fendant before entering a guilty plea, it was only a procedural rule change). 
110 Id. at 1157-58. 
111 Chang Hong, 671 F.3d at 1159. 
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E. Second Circuit and Civil Commitments 
The Second Circuit did not hear a relevant immigration case 
addressing whether Padilla could be applied retroactively, but instead 
rendered a decision on an attorney’s failure to warn of the possibility 
of civil commitment, comparing that consequence to deportation.  In 
United States v. Youngs,112 Youngs pled guilty to possessing child 
pornography.113  During the plea hearing, the court explained the con-
sequences of his plea, including the minimum and maximum jail sen-
tences, the term of supervised release, and the registration as a sex of-
fender.114  However, this plea colloquy did not include the potential 
of civil commitment.115  Youngs argued that this failure to warn was 
equivalent to an attorney failing to warn a noncitizen defendant of the 
potential for deportation that often accompanies a guilty plea.116  Alt-
hough some consequences of guilty pleas had long been considered 
collateral, and thus, do not require an explanation, Youngs argued 
that after the decision in Padilla, the court should follow suit in re-
moving the distinction between direct and collateral consequences.117 
However, the Second Circuit rejected Youngs’s argument.  
The court explained that Padilla was not persuasive in Youngs’s situ-
ation because deportation is a “nearly automatic” consequence, 
whereas the possibility of civil commitment is a much more “remote 
and uncertain consequence.”118  The court also departed from a recent 
Eleventh Circuit decision which extended Padilla to “affirmative 
misrepresentations by counsel regarding civil commitment.”119  That 
case was distinguishable from Youngs because the holding in that de-
cision was strictly limited to a Sixth Amendment ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim, whereas Youngs’ claim was directed at the 
court for failing to warn him during the plea colloquy.120  Ultimately, 
the court held that the district court was not required to advise 
Youngs of the possibility of civil commitment in order to uphold his 
 
112 687 F.3d 56 (2012). 
113 Id. at 58. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 61. 
117 Youngs, 687 F.3d at 60-61. 
118 Id. at 62-63. 
119 Id. at 62 n.4. 
120 Id. 
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guilty plea as knowing and voluntary.121  The court also advised that 
although an allegation of a court’s failure to warn about the possibil-
ity of civil commitment cannot be brought based on Padilla, attor-
neys should not be discouraged from always advising their clients of 
the potential consequences of guilty pleas, both collateral and di-
rect.122 
IV.  THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION AND THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The New York Constitution also includes a right to counsel, 
similar to that of the United States Constitution.  It provides: “In any 
trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to ap-
pear and defend in person and with counsel . . . .”123  Comparable to 
the federal right to counsel, this state standard makes it clear a person 
is entitled to counsel, but does not specify how that counsel must per-
form.  In determining how adequate counsel’s performance must be, 
New York courts rely on precedent from People v. Benevento,124 
which set the threshold at “meaningful representation.”125  This 
standard is objectively measured based on whether counsel used a 
“reasonable and legitimate strategy under the circumstances” and not 
simply whether the attorney won the case.126 
New York courts also employ the Strickland two-prong test to 
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient.127  In New 
York, a defendant must satisfy the two prongs set forth in Strickland 
in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.128  
However, when the claim is analyzed under the New York State Con-
stitution as opposed to the United States Constitution, the prejudice 
test under Strickland is only examined in the general context of 
whether counsel made an error that did not allow the defendant to 
have a fair trial.129 
Similar to the extension of Strickland through the Court’s de-
 
121 Id. at 63. 
122 Youngs, 687 F.3d at 63 n.6. 
123 NY CONST. art. I § 6. 
124 697 N.E.2d 584 (N.Y. 1998). 




129 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588. 
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cision in Padilla, in People v. McDonald130 the right to effective as-
sistance of counsel was expanded to include an attorney’s failure to 
advise a defendant about the immigration consequences of a guilty 
plea in New York.  However, the standard established in McDonald 
is not quite as broad as that of Padilla.  In McDonald, a Jamaican 
immigrant, who was a lawful permanent resident of the United States, 
was charged with possessing and selling marijuana.131  Upon advice 
of counsel, McDonald pled guilty to a lesser charge.132  Shortly after 
sentencing, immigration proceedings were initiated against McDon-
ald.133  Almost two months after the immigration proceedings com-
menced, McDonald’s counsel moved to vacate the judgment based on 
his own ineffective assistance of counsel.134  Defense counsel stated 
that he had “incorrectly advised [McDonald] that his guilty plea 
‘would not result in deportation.’ ”135  Counsel also stated that 
McDonald had maintained his innocence prior to entering the guilty 
plea, and only entered such plea based on counsel’s “affirmative mis-
statements.”136 
In analyzing whether McDonald satisfied the first prong of 
the Strickland test for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 
court stated that although the “mere failure to advise a defendant of 
the possibility of deportation does not constitute ineffective assis-
tance of counsel[,] . . . affirmative misstatements by defense counsel 
may, under certain circumstances, constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”137  Because counsel admitted that he incorrectly informed 
McDonald of his potential for deportation, the court found this prong 
to be satisfied.  However, in McDonald’s motion to vacate, it only 
stated that he was misinformed by counsel, but not that, but for coun-
sel’s misadvice, McDonald would not have pled guilty.138  Therefore, 
the court found that the second prong of the Strickland test was not 
satisfied, and thus, McDonald’s motion was denied.139 
For almost a decade after McDonald, only affirmative mis-
 
130 802 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 2003). 
131 Id. at 132. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 132-33. 
135 McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 133. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 134. 
138 Id. at 135. 
139 Id. 
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statements by counsel were sufficient to satisfy the first prong of 
Strickland for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in regard to 
deportation.  However, after the decision in Padilla was handed 
down, the New York courts began to apply the standard coming out 
of that case, holding counsel responsible for a failure to advise on the 
issue of deportation.  Similar to the disagreement in federal courts, 
the New York courts have also had a difficult time in coming to a 
uniform decision on the retroactivity of Padilla. 
V. RETROACTIVITY IN NEW YORK COURTS 
A. Appellate Division Decisions 
Similar to the circuit split in the federal judicial system, the 
different departments of the Appellate Division in New York have 
rendered inconsistent decisions when addressing the retroactivity of 
Padilla. 
1. First Department 
In the First Department, the court has addressed three cases 
dealing with the retroactivity of Padilla.  First, in People v. Hernan-
dez,140 the court was extremely split in regard to the effect of Padilla 
and three different opinions were submitted.  Hernandez was a Do-
minican Republic native who pled guilty in 2007 to sexual abuse and 
was consequently subject to deportation.141  He filed a motion to va-
cate his conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, but his 
motion was denied by the lower court.142  The first concurring opin-
ion stated that Hernandez sufficiently proved that his counsel had not 
warned him of the immigration consequences of his plea, but he had 
not established that he was prejudiced by this deficient perfor-
mance.143  The opinion referred to the record which established that 
Hernandez took the plea simply because it was his best option, and 
not because his attorney had not advised him of his potential deporta-
 
140 950 N.Y.S.2d 268 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012). 
141 Id. at 270-71 (Freedman, J., dissenting). 
142 Id. at 272. 
143 Id. at 268-69 (Sweeny, J., concurring). 
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tion.144  Therefore, that concurring opinion chose not to address the 
retroactivity of Padilla.145 
The second concurring opinion in Hernandez also agreed that 
Hernandez did not show any prejudice by his counsel’s deficient per-
formance.146  This opinion again relied on the record which evi-
denced that Hernandez was dishonest when discussing his past crimi-
nal history, as well as this case.147  The second concurring opinion 
also noted that Hernandez was not prejudiced because he had previ-
ously been convicted of a felonious assault which rendered him de-
portable, regardless of the outcome of this case.148  Therefore, that 
opinion did not address Padilla or its retroactivity. 
Finally, the dissenting opinion found that Hernandez had been 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.149  That opinion relied 
heavily on the record and included the attorney’s testimony which 
stated he did not remember whether he had discussed the immigration 
consequences of the plea, but doubted it because it was not his usual 
practice to do so.150  The dissenting judge believed that this lack of 
advice would satisfy the first prong of Strickland.151  Furthermore, the 
record stated that Hernandez was the “sole provider for and primary 
caretaker of his six children.”152  Therefore, the dissenting judge stat-
ed it was likely Hernandez was prejudiced by the deficient perfor-
mance of his counsel because he would have risked going to trial in-
stead of being automatically deported and taken away from his 
children “indefinitely.”153  Thus, the second prong of Strickland was 
satisfied and Hernandez sufficiently made a claim for ineffective as-
sistance of counsel.154  Although this opinion did not address the ret-
roactivity of Padilla, it is likely the dissenter would have found it to 
be retroactive because he found Hernandez had established a viola-
tion of his Sixth Amendment rights. 
 
144 Id. at 269. 
145 Hernandez, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 269 (Sweeny, J., concurring). 
146 Id. (Manzanet Daniels, J., concurring). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 270 (Freedman, J., dissenting). 
150 Hernandez, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 271 (Freedman, J., dissenting). 
151 Id. at 272. 
152 Id. at 274. 
153 Id. at 274-275. 
154 Id. at 273, 275. 
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In People v. Ogunmekan,155 the First Department refused to 
address the retroactivity of Padilla or even look at whether the attor-
ney provided advice on the immigration consequences of a plea until 
the prejudice prong of Padilla was satisfied.  Even though 
Ogunmekan pled guilty to a crime that would render him deportable 
and it was unclear whether his counsel advised him of potential de-
portation, Ogunmekan failed to demonstrate that, but for his counsel 
failing to advise him of this consequence, he would have went to tri-
al.156  Thus the court did not go any further into determining “new” 
versus “old” rules and the subsequent retroactive effect.157 
Finally, in People v. Baret,158 the court addressed the issue of 
retroactivity and came to a decision on the matter.
159
  Baret was con-
victed of selling a controlled substance, a crime that rendered him 
deportable.160  Baret filed a motion to vacate claiming his attorney 
was ineffective for failing to advise him of the deportation conse-
quence of his conviction.161  The court used the standards set forth by 
Strickland and found Padilla to apply retroactively to Baret’s mo-
tion.162  The court stated that “[w]hen a Supreme Court decision ap-
plies a well-established constitutional principle to a new circum-
stance, it is considered to be an application of an ‘old’ rule, and is 
always retroactive.”163  In New York, the Court of Appeals had pre-
viously held that immigration status was a collateral consequence of a 
conviction or plea, and thus, a failure to warn of this consequence 
would not amount to ineffective assistance unless there was evidence 
of actual misadvice.164  However, after Padilla, it was clarified that 
Strickland must apply to giving advice on immigration consequenc-
es.165  Therefore, because Padilla was found to be retroactive, the 
court held Baret was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the 
advice his attorney gave him on the immigration consequences was 
constitutionally deficient and if it was deficient, whether it was likely 
 
155 945 N.Y.S.2d 58 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012). 
156 Id. at 60-61. 
157 Id. 
158 952 N.Y.S.2d 108 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 109. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
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Baret would have went to trial instead of pleading.166 
2. Second Department 
The Second Department has recently addressed one signifi-
cant case on the matter of effective assistance of counsel and its rela-
tion to deportation.
167
  Picca was born in Italy, lived in France for 
part of his childhood, and ultimately immigrated to the United States 
where he became a lawful permanent resident.168  He had consistently 
worked in the United States, as well as met and married an American 
citizen and had children who are American citizens.169  In 2005, Picca 
was charged with drug offenses and pled guilty, based on the advice 
of counsel.170  The plea required Picca to enter a drug program, but he 
relapsed shortly after his completion of the program and removal 
proceedings were initiated.171  Picca submitted a motion to vacate his 
conviction and claimed he was unaware of the immigration conse-
quences of his plea.172 
Similar to the other departments, the Second Department first 
looked to Strickland to determine if Picca had satisfied the two-prong 
test for ineffective assistance of counsel.173  The court also recog-
nized, pursuant to Padilla, that failure of an attorney to warn about 
immigration consequences or misadvising about these consequences 
could constitute ineffective assistance.174  Picca attested that he was 
unaware of the potential for deportation until his wife went out on her 
own and consulted an immigration attorney.175  After determining 
that this satisfied the first prong of Strickland, the court then turned to 
whether the second prong was satisfied in a Padilla context.176  The 
record contained evidence of Picca having substantial ties in the 
 
166 Id. 
167 People v. Picca, 947 N.Y.S.2d 120 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012). 
168 Id. at 122.  
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 123. 
171 Id. 
172 Picca, 947 N.Y.S.2d at 123. 
173 Id. at 124-25. 
174 Id. at 125. 
175 Id. at 126. 
176 Id. at 127 (noting that to satisfy the second prong of Strickland under Padilla, the de-
fendant “must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been 
rational under the circumstances”) (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485). 
19
Breslawski: The Retroactivity of Padilla
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
1506 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
United States, including a wife, family, and children.177  Taking these 
facts into consideration, the court found that “the defendant’s aver-
ments sufficiently alleged that a decision to reject the plea offer, and 
take a chance, however slim, of being acquitted after trial, would 
have been rational.”178  Ultimately, the court found that Picca had sat-
isfied the two prongs of Strickland, and thus, remanded the case for a 
determination on Picca’s ineffective assistance claim.179  In a foot-
note, the court explained that it was not addressing the retroactivity of 
Padilla because Picca’s “direct appeal was pending at the time the 
[Padilla] decision . . . was rendered,” and thus, Picca was entitled to 
apply that rule to his case.180 
3. Third Department 
The Third Department has discussed three relevant cases in 
the past year.  In People v. Glasgow,181 Glasgow was a citizen of 
Guyana, but had become a lawful permanent resident in the United 
States.182  In 2005, he was charged with a drug offense and ultimately 
pled guilty to a lesser charge.183  After removal proceedings were 
subsequently initiated against Glasgow, he filed a motion to vacate 
his conviction in order to remain in the country.184  He alleged his at-
torney had misinformed him of the potential immigration conse-
quences that accompanied his guilty plea, and thus, violated his right 
to effective counsel.185  Once again the court relied upon the federal 
standard of Strickland’s two-prong test in order to determine if Glas-
gow’s claim of deprivation of meaningful representation was legiti-
mate.186  In support of his argument, Glasgow explained that he had 
spoken with his attorney about the possibility of removal, but the at-
torney summarily dismissed his concerns by suggesting that the risk 
of deportation was minimal because he was a “small fish” in compar-
 
177 Picca, 947 N.Y.S.2d at 130. 
178 Id. at 130. 
179 Id. at 132-33. 
180 Id. at 125 n.1. 
181 943 N.Y.S.2d 674 (App. Div. 3rd Dep’t 2012). 




186 Glasgow, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 676. 
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ison to other deportable criminals.187  Also significant to the court’s 
decision was the fact that Glasgow’s attorney had testified that he had 
advised his client on the likelihood of immigration consequences ac-
companying his guilty plea.188  The court ultimately found that be-
cause Glasgow had been “advised that removal was a possible conse-
quence of his guilty plea, and was not misinformed to the contrary, he 
did not establish that counsel failed to fulfill his obligations on this 
issue or that his advice was deficient so as to satisfy . . . an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.”189  Simply because the attorney shared 
his opinion on what he believed to be the likelihood of deportation, 
and the court found to the contrary, he cannot be found to have pro-
vided constitutionally deficient assistance.190 
Shortly after Glasgow, the Third Department decided People 
v. Carty,191 another case in which an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim was brought.  Carty was not a citizen of the United States and 
immigration proceedings were initiated after Carty pled guilty to the 
charged drug offense.192  Carty moved to vacate his guilty plea on the 
ground that neither his attorney, nor the court, advised him of the po-
tential for his deportation.193  However, unlike the other cases dis-
cussed in which the defendants were known to be immigrants, 
Carty’s background information stated that he was a United States 
citizen even though he was not.194  Carty never took any steps to cor-
rect this mistake or to inform his attorney that he was not in fact a cit-
izen of the United States.195  Consequently, his attorney never dis-
cussed the possibility of deportation with Carty because it appeared 
to be irrelevant.196  Although the court did not go into an in-depth 
analysis of the retroactivity of Padilla, the opinion included a foot-





190 Id.  (“The fact that counsel, in advising defendant to accept the favorable plea deal, 
may have expressed his experience-based assessment of the likelihood that removal proceed-
ings might or might not be initiated depending upon different factors was not mislead-
ing . . . .”  Glasgow, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 676.). 
191 947 N.Y.S.2d 617 (App. Div. 3rd Dep’t 2012). 
192 Id. at 618. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 619. 
195 Id. 
196 Carty, 947 N.Y.S.2d at 619. 
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should “apply to collateral challenges to final convictions.”197  There-
fore, the court retroactively applied its principles to the case at hand 
and found that only when “attorneys know that their clients face pos-
sible exile form this country and separation from their families” that 
they are required to advise the defendant about immigration conse-
quences.198  Therefore, Carty failed to prove that his counsel’s per-
formance was deficient and the Third Department rejected his claim 
accordingly.199 
Finally, the Third Department heard People v. Haley200 in 
June of 2012.  Haley was a Guyanese immigrant who had become a 
lawful permanent resident of the United States.201  In 2002, he pled 
guilty to aggravated unlicensed operation of a vehicle and driving 
while intoxicated.202  As a result of this plea, deportation proceedings 
were initiated against Haley.203  In turn, Haley promptly filed a mo-
tion to vacate his conviction claiming his attorney had not advised 
him of his possible deportation.204  The court explained that Haley 
would have to satisfy the federal standard for ineffective assistance of 
counsel created by Strickland in order to prevail on his claim to have 
the conviction vacated.205  Without properly analyzing the issue of 
retroactivity, the court presumed that the Court in Padilla intended 
for its rule of law to be retroactively applied.206  However, Haley had 
previous convictions on his record that rendered him a deportable al-
ien notwithstanding the conviction at issue; therefore, under Strick-
land and Padilla, the court could not have found that Haley was prej-
udiced by the failure of his attorney to warn him of his possible 
deportation.207 
 
197 Id. at 619 n.3. 
198 Id. at 620 (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484). 
199 Id. at 620-21. 
200 946 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 3rd Dep’t 2012). 




205 Haley, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 679. 
206 Id. 
207 Id.  “[R]egardless of whether defendant pleaded guilty to the charges . . . , had been 
found guilty after trial or had been acquitted, his status as a deportable alien would not have 
been affected.”  Id. 
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4. Appellate Term 
In People v. Hassan,208 the Appellate Term addressed a simi-
lar ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the effect of Padilla.209  
Hassan was charged with a drug offense to which he subsequently 
pled guilty.210  Thereafter, Hassan filed a motion to vacate his convic-
tion on the grounds of his attorney’s misadvice in regards to the im-
migration consequences of his plea.211  As an initial matter, the Ap-
pellate Term observed that in order for any defendant to prevail on 
such a claim, he must either satisfy the federal standard set forth in 
Strickland or the New York standard of “meaningful representation” 
set forth in Benevento.212  Because Hassan claimed he specifically 
asked his attorney about the potential immigration consequences of 
his plea and his attorney assured him there would not be any reper-
cussions, Hassan satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test.213  
Hassan also satisfied the second prong of the Strickland test by and 
through his claim that had his attorney informed him of the potential 
consequence of deportation, he would have taken the risk and pro-
ceeded to trial.214  In determining that Strickland was satisfied, in ad-
herence with the Third Department’s approach in Glasgow, the court 
held that it need not determine the retroactivity of Padilla.215 
VI.  PUTTING THE QUESTION TO REST: CHAIDEZ 
The United States Supreme Court recently put to rest the 
questions surrounding the retroactive application of the precedent es-
tablished by the Court in Padilla in Chaidez v. United States.216  The 
Court granted certiorari to this case after the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that, although Padilla created a new rule, it could not be ap-
plied retroactively because it did not fit squarely within one of the 
two exceptions identified in Teague. 
 




212 Id. (noting that Hassan satisfied the two prongs of Strickland, and thus, the court did 
not need to consider the New York standard of “meaningful representation”). 
213 Hassan, No. 2010-2643 at *1. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at *2. 
216 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013). 
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Chaidez was a native Mexican who moved to the United 
States and became a lawful permanent resident.217  In 2003, she was 
indicted for mail fraud and charged with an aggravated felony be-
cause the fraud caused a loss exceeding $10,000.218  Relying upon her 
counsel’s advice, Chaidez entered a guilty plea and immigration re-
moval proceedings were initiated subsequent to the entry of her sen-
tence.219  Seeking to vacate her conviction in order to remain in the 
country, Chaidez filed a writ of coram nobis in which she claimed in-
effective assistance of counsel.220  Padilla was decided while this writ 
was pending review.221  In the subsequent review of Chaidez’s writ, 
the district court found Padilla to be a mere “application of the 
Court’s holding in Strickland . . .;”222 thus, it was an “old rule” that 
could be retroactively applied to Chaidez’s case.223  Consequently, 
the district court considered the merits of Chaidez’s writ of coram 
nobis and ultimately vacated her conviction.224 
On appeal, the government argued against the district court’s 
retroactive application of Padilla.225  In its decision, the Seventh Cir-
cuit cited to language from Padilla in which the Court “[n]ot[ed] that 
it had ‘never applied a distinction between direct and collateral con-
sequences to define the scope of constitutionally reasonable profes-
sional assistance required under Strickland.’ ”226  Likewise, the court 
observed that many federal district courts, as well as circuit courts, 
had all held, prior to Padilla, that counsel was not required under the 
Sixth Amendment to provide information about collateral, as opposed 
to direct, consequences of a guilty plea.227  Using this rationale, be-
cause Strickland did not include a requirement to advise a client 
about immigration consequences, it follows that Padilla created a 
“new rule” that “constitutionally effective assistance of counsel re-
quires advice about a civil penalty imposed by the Executive 
 
217 Id. at 1105. 
218 Id. at 1105-06. 
219 Id. at 1106. 
220 Id. 
221 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106. 
222 Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686. 
223 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 687 (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
227 Id. at 690. 
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Branch . . . after the criminal case is closed.”228 
The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision, finding that, based on the framework set forth by Teague, 
Padilla was a “new rule,” and thus, not retroactive.229  The Court not-
ed Padilla would have been considered an “old rule” if it simply clar-
ified that a lawyer would be considered ineffective if he or she did 
not inform the defendant of the potential for deportation.230  Howev-
er, the Court instead concluded that Padilla created a prerequisite to 
the Strickland test.231  It established that a court must first look to 
whether the Strickland test is appropriate to apply before determining 
whether the counsel’s performance was ineffective.232  Because the 
Court found it to be the initial inquiry, it stated “[i]f that does not 
count as breaking new ground or imposing a new obligation, we are 
hard pressed to know what would.”233  Therefore, as a “new rule,” 
Padilla may not be used retroactively to overturn a conviction for a 







228 Id. at 693.  “Under Teague, a rule is old only if it sets forth the sole reasonable inter-
pretation of existing precedent.”  Id. at 692.  Although it would seem that Padilla is just an 
example of Strickland being applied to a specific set of facts and thus is just an extension of 
Strickland, Padilla is sufficiently novel and should be held to have created an entirely sepa-
rate and new rule.  Id. at 692-93. 
229 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1105. 
230 Id. at 1108. 
231 Id.  “Padilla had to develop new law, establishing that the Sixth Amendment applied at 
all, before it could assess the performance of Padilla’s lawyer under Strickland.”  Id. at 1111. 
232 Id. at 1110. 
233 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
234 Id. at 1113. 
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